Gaussian Broadcast Channels with an Orthogonal and Bidirectional Cooperation Link

This paper considers a system where one transmitter broadcasts a single common message to two receivers linked by a bidirectional cooperation channel, which is assumed to be orthogonal to the downlink channel. Assuming a simplified setup where, in particular, scalar relaying protocols are used and channel coding is not exploited, we want to provide elements of response to several questions of practical interest. Here are the main underlying issues: 1. The way of recombining the signals at the receivers; 2. The optimal number of cooperation rounds; 3. The way of cooperating (symmetrically or asymmetrically; which receiver should start cooperating in the latter case); 4. The influence of spectral resources. These issues are considered by studying the performance of the assumed system through analytical results when they are derivable and through simulation results. For the particular choices we made, the results sometimes do not coincide with those available for the discrete counterpart of the studied channel

A generalization of a trace inequality for positive definite matrices

In this note we generalize the trace inequality derived by [1] to the case where the number of terms of the sum (denoted by K) is arbitrary

From Spectrum Pooling to Space Pooling: Opportunistic Interference Alignment in MIMO Cognitive Networks

We describe a non-cooperative interference alignment (IA) technique which allows an opportunistic multiple input multiple output (MIMO) link (secondary) to harmlessly coexist with another MIMO link (primary) in the same frequency band. Assuming perfect channel knowledge at the primary receiver and transmitter, capacity is achieved by transmiting along the spatial directions (SD) associated with the singular values of its channel matrix using a water-filling power allocation (PA) scheme. Often, power limitations lead the primary transmitter to leave some of its SD unused. Here, it is shown that the opportunistic link can transmit its own data if it is possible to align the interference produced on the primary link with such unused SDs. We provide both a processing scheme to perform IA and a PA scheme which maximizes the transmission rate of the opportunistic link. The asymptotes of the achievable transmission rates of the opportunistic link are obtained in the regime of large numbers of antennas. Using this result, it is shown that depending on the signal-to-noise ratio and the number of transmit and receive antennas of the primary and opportunistic links, both systems can achieve transmission rates of the same order.Comment: Submitted to IEEE Trans. in Signal Processing. Revised on 23-11-0

On the Fictitious Play and Channel Selection Games

Considering the interaction through mutual interference of the different radio devices, the channel selection (CS) problem in decentralized parallel multiple access channels can be modeled by strategic-form games. Here, we show that the CS problem is a potential game (PG) and thus the fictitious play (FP) converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) either in pure or mixed strategies. Using a 2-player 2-channel game, it is shown that convergence in mixed strategies might lead to cycles of action profiles which lead to individual spectral efficiencies (SE) which are worse than the SE at the worst NE in mixed and pure strategies. Finally, exploiting the fact that the CS problem is a PG and an aggregation game, we present a method to implement FP with local information and minimum feedback.Comment: In proc. of the IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM), Bogota, Colombia, September, 201

Introducing Hierarchy in Energy Games

In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to be able to react to the leader's decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in non-cooperative power control games not only improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can also be a way of insuring the existence of a non-saturated equilibrium and reaching a desired trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. In this respect, the way of measuring the global performance of an energy-efficient network is shown to be a critical issue.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Trans. on Wireless Communication

Coded Power Control : Performance Analysis

International audienceIn this paper, we introduce the general concept of coded power control (CPC) in a particular setting of the interference channel. Roughly, the idea of CPC consists in embedding information (about a random state) into the transmit power levels themselves: in this new framework, provided the power levels of a given transmitter can be observed (through a noisy channels) by other transmitters, a sequence of power levels of the former can therefore be used to coordinate the latter. To assess the limiting performance of CPC (and therefore the potential performance brought by this new approach), we derive, as a first step towards many extensions of the present work, a general result which not only concerns power control (PC) but also any scenario involving two decision-makers (DMs) which communicate through their actions and have the following information and decision structures. We assume that the DMs want to maximize the average of an arbitrarily chosen instantaneous payoff function which depends on the DMs' actions and the state realization. DM 1 is assumed to know non-causally the state (e.g., the channel state) which affects the common payoff while the other, say DM 2, has only a strictly causal knowledge of it. DM 1 can only use its own actions (e.g., power levels) to inform DM 2 about its best action in terms of payoff. Importantly, DM 2 can only monitor the actions of DM 1 imperfectly and DM 1 does not observe DM 2. The latter assumption leads us to exploiting Shannon-theoretic tools in order to generalize an existing theorem which provides the information constraint under which the payoff is maximized. The derived result is then exploited to fully characterize the performance of good CPC policies for a given instance of the interference channel

Impact of Mobility on MIMO Green Wireless Systems

This paper studies the impact of mobility on the power consumption of wireless networks. With increasing mobility, we show that the network should dedicate a non negligible fraction of the useful rate to estimate the different degrees of freedom. In order to keep the rate constant, we quantify the increase of power required for several cases of interest. In the case of a point to point MIMO link, we calculate the minimum transmit power required for a target rate and outage probability as a function of the coherence time and the number of antennas. Interestingly, the results show that there is an optimal number of antennas to be used for a given coherence time and power consumption. This provides a lower bound limit on the minimum power required for maintaining a green network.Comment: Accepted for EUSIPCO conference. 5 page

Power Allocation Games in Wireless Networks of Multi-antenna Terminals

We consider wireless networks that can be modeled by multiple access channels in which all the terminals are equipped with multiple antennas. The propagation model used to account for the effects of transmit and receive antenna correlations is the unitary-invariant-unitary model, which is one of the most general models available in the literature. In this context, we introduce and analyze two resource allocation games. In both games, the mobile stations selfishly choose their power allocation policies in order to maximize their individual uplink transmission rates; in particular they can ignore some specified centralized policies. In the first game considered, the base station implements successive interference cancellation (SIC) and each mobile station chooses his best space-time power allocation scheme; here, a coordination mechanism is used to indicate to the users the order in which the receiver applies SIC. In the second framework, the base station is assumed to implement single-user decoding. For these two games a thorough analysis of the Nash equilibrium is provided: the existence and uniqueness issues are addressed; the corresponding power allocation policies are determined by exploiting random matrix theory; the sum-rate efficiency of the equilibrium is studied analytically in the low and high signal-to-noise ratio regimes and by simulations in more typical scenarios. Simulations show that, in particular, the sum-rate efficiency is high for the type of systems investigated and the performance loss due to the use of the proposed suboptimum coordination mechanism is very small